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Hungary was initially the front-runner among the for-
mer socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe
in terms of market reforms and gradually liberalised
its economy in the 1980s. At the beginning of the
1990s, it seemed to be in the best position to converge
fast with the European Union both in terms of in  -
come level and institutional quality. However, this
convergence has stalled since the mid-2000s, with
recent policy measures undermining the security of
property rights and private contracts. Hungary was
the first country to apply for an International
Monetary Fund (IMF) administrated international
bail-out during the latest financial crisis in the
European Union (see Table 5.1 for a summary of
Hungary’s macroeconomic data). By the end of 2011
it was one of the most financially vulnerable countries
in Europe outside the euro area.
This chapter summarises recent developments in
Hungary and aims to shed some light on why
Hungary failed to live up to the expectations of the
early 1990s. Section 5.2 analyses Hungary’s growth
performance since 1990, and is followed by an analy-
sis of its labour markets in Section 5.3. Section 5.4
assesses its fiscal policy and Section 5.5 explains why
Hungary was one of the first countries in Europe to
be bailed-out, and how the Hungarian economy
responded to crises. Lastly, Section 5.6 assesses the
economic policy measures implemented by Hungary
since mid-2010, and their implications for future
growth and employment. The chapter closes with
some general conclusions.
5.2 Growth performance
Hungary’s GDP grew annually by about three percent
over the period of 1995–2008 (see Table 5.1). The
GDP of the old EU member states1 grew annually by
2.2 percent on average during the same period. This
difference in growth rates is not large enough to close
the income gap between Hungary and the old EU
members in the foreseeable future. To shed more light
on why GDP growth in Hungary was relatively low,
we first present the evolution of Hungary’s income
gap defined as GDP per capita relative to the old EU
Table 5.1 





2002–2008 2009  2010 
Growth rates, in % 
GDP  2.9 3.1  –  6.8 1.3 
Private consumption expenditure  1.7  3.2  – 6.2  – 2.2 
General government consumption expenditure  – 0.3  1.7  – 0.6  – 2.1 
Gross fixed capital formation  5.0  3.5  – 11.0  – 9.7 
Exports of goods and services  14.4  10.9  – 10.2  14.3 
Imports of goods and services  12.7  10.1  – 14.8  12.8 
Inflation, CPI, in %
a)  16.2 5.4 4.0 4.7 
Unemployment rate, in %  8.0  6.8  10.1  11.2 
Government finances, in % of GDP 
General government net lending  – 5.5  – 6.9  – 4.5  – 4.3 
General government gross debt   63.6  62.7  78.4  80.2 
Current account, in % of GDP  – 5.5  – 7.5  – 0.2  1.1 
Foreign direct investment, in % of GDP  6.3  4.6  1.6  1.2 
a) OECD data for 1995–2001 and Eurostat for all other periods. 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, last accessed on 19 October 2011. 
1 Old EU member states are defined as the 15 members in 1995.
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of its labour productivity gap
similarly defined as GDP per
hour worked relative to the old
EU member states.2 Secondly, we
provide a decomposition of the
income gap and use classical
growth accounting to understand
the factors behind Hungary’s
growth performance.
The first panel of Figure 5.1
shows the time evolution of the
income gap for Hungary and for
the other three Visegrad Group
countries3 measured in GDP per
capita. After initially falling in
the early 1990s, relative GDP
increased in all four countries.
Since 2005, however, Hungary’s relative income has
stagnated. By 2010 it was the poorest member of the
Visegrad Group due to the strong growth perfor-
mance of Slovakia and Poland since 1995. The sec-
ond panel of Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of the
labour productivity gap. Firstly, it is important to
note that the income gap and labour productivity
gap of Hungary display the same flat pattern after
2005. Secondly, Hungary only exhibited strong
labour productivity growth between 2000 and 2005
when it closed the labour productivity gap by eight
percentage points. In the other periods, the
Hungarian labour productivity gap was flat.
Slovakia, on the other hand, has exhibited strong
labour productivity growth since the early 1990s, and
closed its labour productivity gap by 25 percentage
points.
Let us now breakdown the income gap into three
parts: the worker-to-population-ratio gap, the hours-
per-worker gap and the labour-productivity gap. This
breakdown is performed for 1995 when the shock due
the reform and liberalisation in the early 1990s had
already dissipated, and for 2008, the last year before
the full force of the financial crisis’ impact was felt.
The result of the breakdown is displayed in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2 
Accounting for GDP per capita gap relative to EU-15 
  
GDP per  
capita gap 
Worker to 
population ratio gap 
Hours per  
worker gap 
GDP per hour 
worked gap 
1995 
Czech  Republic  –  53.4 19.5 17.8  –  90.7 
Hungary  – 83.9  – 4.7  17.3  – 96.5 
Poland  – 106.8  – 6.9  7.1  – 107.0 
Slovakia  – 89.4  – 4.3  10.6  – 95.7 
   2008 
Czech  Republic  –  34.9 13.1 19.6  –  67.6 
Hungary  – 62.2  – 9.9  20.8  – 73.1 
Poland  – 70.6  – 10.4  25.0  – 85.2 
Slovakia  – 49.8  – 9.9  9.2  – 49.1 
Note: Gaps are calculated as log differences multiplied by 100 to preserve additivity. A negative (positive) 
entry in the table is equivalent to the relevant ratio being below (above) 100 percent. 













Source: Total Economy Database, Conference Board 2011.
Index: EU-15=100 Index: EU-15=100










2 We loosely use the term “gap” here to refer to these relative mea-
sures. In this context, “closing the gap” means that the measure
moved closer to 100.
3 The Visegrad Group is an alliance of four Central-Eastern
European states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia, formed in 1991 for the purposes of cooperation and sup-
porting their European integration. These countries provide a useful
comparison for Hungary.EEAG Report 2012 117
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As Figure 5.1 also shows, GDP per capita is closer
to that of the old EU members than labour produc-
tivity. This is primarily accounted for by employees
in the Visegrad countries working longer hours than
those in the old EU member states. The worker-to-
population-ratio4 gap plays a lesser role in explain-
ing the income gap, and unlike hours per worker,
the worker-to-population ratio is lower in the old
EU member states than in the Visegrad countries,
except for the Czech Republic. The breakdown
highlights that the relatively small Czech income
gap is largely explained by longer hours worked and
by a higher employment rate. One important impli-
cation of this breakdown exercise is that longer
hours worked play an important role in three out of
these four countries in raising relative income.
However, further increases in the number of hours
worked per worker are unlikely to lead to a sus-
tained income convergence. 
Sustained labour productivity growth is the key to
convergence. Growth accounting helps us to under-
stand the main factors that drive it. Table 5.3 pre-
sents the results of a growth accounting exercise
comparing two periods: 1995–2001 and 2002–2008.
The growth rates of real GDP per hour worked are
broken down into the contribution of the labour
composition,5 into two types of capital and total fac-
tor productivity (TFP). The analysis suggests that
the primary source of Hungary’s labour productivi-
ty growth was growth in capital stock and, to a less-
er extent, growth in TFP. Capital accumulation con-
tributed 2.0 percent and 2.4 percent respectively to
the 3.0 percent and 3.2 percent growth of real GDP
per hour worked in Hungary in the first and second
period. In contrast, TFP growth was the primary
source of labour productivity growth in both periods
in Poland and in Slovakia, and in the second period
in the Czech Republic. Weak and declining TFP
growth in Hungary suggests serious structural prob-
lems, which inhibit faster productivity growth.
Unless TFP picks up, we expect Hungary to eventu-
ally diverge from the rest of Europe, as margins of
convergence through hours worked and capital accu-
mulation are gradually exhausted.
Kónya (2011) provides explanations for why growth in
capital stock is a more important source of labour
productivity growth than in the other Visegrad coun-
tries. He calibrates a one-sector real business cycle
model to assess the size of distortions in the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland.6 The labour wedge
distorts the labour and leisure choice, and the invest-
ment wedge distorts saving-investment decisions. A
high labour wedge means that labour taxes deter peo-
ple from working, implying that the amount of total
hours worked is sub-optimally low. Similarly, the
investment wedge is the gap between the total and pri-
vate return on investment. The greater that wedge, the
lower the productive investment relative to the opti-
mal level. Kónya finds that the labour wedge on aver-
age was significantly higher in Hungary than in the
Table 5.3 












capital services    TFP 
                                                  Average 1995–2001 
Czech Republic  2.7  0.2  1.1  1.9  – 0.5 
Hungary  3.0 0.2 0.8 1.2 0.8 
Poland  3.8 0.1 0.4 0.9 2.4 
Slovakia  4.2 0.1 0.5 0.9 2.7 
                                                Average 2002–2008 
Czech  Republic  3.9 0.3 0.2 1.5 1.9 
Hungary  3.2 0.6 1.5 0.9 0.2 
Poland  3.6 0.3 0.7 0.7 1.9 
Slovakia  5.7 0.2 1.1 0.8 3.6 
a) ICT refers to “information and communication technologies”. 
Source: Total Economy Database, The Conference Board 2011. 
4 Workers here are measured as the number of persons engaged in
production, and include full-time workers, full-time equivalent, part-
time workers and the self-employed.
5 The change in labour composition is calculated as the weighted
change in the skill composition of the workforce where labour com-
pensation for each skill group is used as weight.
6 Distortions are formally defined as wedges between marginal rates
of substitution and the corresponding prices.other two countries.7 If distor-
tions in the labour markets are
relatively large, firms will substi-
tute capital for labour.8 This can
lead to a faster increase in capital
services for a prolonged period of
time in a country with high
labour market distortions, even if
distortions in the labour markets
only affect the level of GDP and
not its growth rate in the long
run. Moreover, it also follows
that once firms have adjusted
their technology to accommo-
date a distorted labour market,
capital accumulation will slow
down, implying a further decline
in labour productivity growth. In
other words, the large contribu-
tion of capital accumulation to
Hungarian growth may just be a
transitory, and not particularly
welcome, phenomenon of capi-
tal/labour substitution, similar to
the experiences of many Western
European countries following
increases in labour costs in the early 1970s. 
However, this does not account for the lower TFP
growth. One factor that may explain it is sectoral
change.9 If productive resources are reallocated to
sectors with low productivity growth, aggregate
growth falls. Bah and Brada (2009) study structural
change in the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. They point out the stylised fact that central plan-
ning generated a higher share of agriculture and
industry in output than observed in market
economies. This is documented in the left panel of
Figure 5.2, which shows that the shares of agriculture
and industry (construction, manufacturing, mining
and utilities) of GDP were significantly higher and
the share of services significantly lower in 1990 in the
former socialist countries than
the share that their level of devel-
opment would imply. In 2008 the
shares of the three sectors in the
former socialist countries were
more or less in line with the
shares implied by their level of development. There
was therefore a reallocation towards the service sector.
Since the service sector tends to have lower productiv-
ity growth than manufacturing, this reallocation
could be a source of lower TFP growth in Hungary.10
A related explanation is that distortions within these
broad sectors are the sources of low TFP growth in
Hungary. Since such distortions can have a large effect
on TFP,11 its growth in Hungary is likely to depend on
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Source: World Development Indicators, September 2011.
Note: Quadratic curves are fitted to the pooled annual data of the periods 1990−2008.
1990                                                      2008
Structural transformation in Europe
Figure 5.2
Table 5.4 





2002–2008 2009  2010 
Czech Republic  1.6  5.4  – 11.5  0.2 
Hungary  6.5  2.9  – 11.0  – 9.7 
Poland  8.6  9.0  – 1.3  – 0.1 
Slovakia 5.7  6.3  –  19.7  12.4 
Source: Eurostat, last accessed on 21 November 2011. 
7 The difference in average investment
wedges across the three countries is much
smaller than the labour wedge.
8 See Blanchard (1997) on this type of sub-
stitution after the mid-1970s in Europe.
9 See Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and
Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2011).
10 This effect can be offset by reallocation if the resources devoted to
agriculture and industry were inefficiently high before liberalisation,
and the reallocation improved efficiency significantly in agriculture
and industry afterwards. However, this offsetting effect is more like-
ly to be important in the periods shortly after liberalisation i.e., in the
1990s and not in the 2000s.
11 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) found that the effect of misallocation of
production factors at a firm level on aggregate TFP is substantial.EEAG Report 2012 119
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whether these distortions can be eliminated in the
years ahead.
Finally, if TFP growth is driven by technology adop-
tion, and technology adoption requires investment,
then declining investment can be a source of lower
TFP growth. Table 5.4 shows that the growth of fixed
investment was relatively high in Hungary compared
to the other Visegrad countries in 1995–2001, but was
lowest in 2002–2008.12 Moreover, Hungary experi-
enced the largest fall in investment in 2009–2010, and
the quarterly data suggest that this fall in investment
continued into 2011. To the extent that investment
itself is a source of TFP growth, the declining invest-
ment in Hungary may constitute an explanation of
low TFP growth.
5.3 Labour market trends
The Hungarian labour market is characterised by a
moderate unemployment rate, a relatively low partici-
pation rate and flexible labour market institutions.
The left panel in Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of
unemployment, whereas the right panel illustrates the
participation rates in the Visegrad countries. The
Hungarian unemployment rate hovered around
7.5 percent between 1995 and 2008, which is not par-
ticularly high in Europe. The Czech unemployment
rate remained below 9 percent
between 1993 and 2010. In Po  -
land and Slovakia, on the other
hand, unemployment increased
drastically in the late 1990s,
remaining above 15 percent for
several years and only dropping
after 2005. However, it in  creased
again due to the impact of the
financial crisis of 2008. 
The Hungarian labour market is
flexible.13 Union coverage is low
and declining, and the unions
have little power. Hungary’s
employment protection index is
also the lowest in the region,
while hiring and firing costs are
low by international comparison.
The adjustment of wages is also relatively easy.14
The more striking feature of the Hungarian labour
market is displayed in the right panel of Figure 5.3.
Labour force participation is significantly lower in
Hungary than in other Visegrad countries. It fell from
about 65 percent in 1993 to about 58 percent in 1997.
It subsequently increased, but still stood at a low
62 percent in 2010. Labour force participation was in
2010 in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia about
8 percentage points higher than in Hungary. The
rapid initial decline of participation in Hungary can
be primarily explained by two factors: privatisation
that affected labour demand, and pension and benefit
policy that affected labour supply. 
Privatisation in Hungary led to a change in the com-
position of labour demand: demand for skilled work-
ers increased relative to demand for unskilled workers.
Unlike some other Central and Eastern European
countries, Hungary did not adopt a mass privatisation
scheme whereby state assets were distributed among
its citizens. Instead, it sold its assets on a case-by-case
basis to investors, primarily foreigners. This led to
increased competition among firms and generated a
massive restructuring and a reallocation of resources
across different activities. This can also be seen in











Source: OECD, last accessed on 19 October 2011.
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12 Note that figures in Table 5.4 measure the growth rate of invest-
ment. In contrast, Table 5.3 measures the contribution of growth in
capital services to the growth rate in GDP per hour worked.
Although growth in capital services is related to investment, the fig-
ures across the two tables are not directly comparable. Hence it is
possible that the contribution of capital services to the growth rate in
GDP per hour worked is high, while the growth rate of investment is
low in the same period.
13 See Köllő (2011) for a discussion.
14 Kátay (2011) finds that Hungary has the lowest downward real
wage rigidity among the European countries that participated in the
International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP). It also has lower then
average downward nominal wage rigidity. The IWFP was sponsored
by the European Central Bank and its goal was to provide micro-
economic evidence of the costs and benefits of inflation in labour
markets for a number of advanced economies. sectors. Between 1990 and 1995 employment in
Hungary fell by 10 percentage points in agriculture
and by 4 percentage points in industry. During this
process a lot of jobs, primarily low skilled ones, were
destroyed. Ceteris paribus this shifted labour demand
towards skilled workers. Secondly, the new owners
invested in modern technology inducing a rapid skill-
biased technological change, which also shifted labour
demand towards skilled workers.15 If only these fac-
tors affecting labour demand were at work, however,
we would expect the employment rate to eventually
recover, since they are transitory factors associated
with the restructuring of the Hungarian economy
from a centrally planned to a market economy.
There is, however, a second factor that negatively
affects labour supply and contributes to the low par-
ticipation rate in Hungary, namely the pension and
benefit policies of successive governments. Until 1996
the legal retirement age was 55 for women and 60 for
men. After 1996, the legal retirement age was gradu-
ally increased to 62 for both sexes. The retirement age
is 62 for men as of 2001 and the same age for woman
as of 2009. This is still relatively low by international
standards. Furthermore, with a sufficiently long
employment history, it was possible to retire up to
three years earlier than the legal retirement age with
no or little penalty in terms of a lower pension. Not
surprisingly, the average effective retirement age in
Hungary was about two and a half years lower than
the legal one according to OECD data. In addition,
there was also the option of retiring on health
grounds and drawing disability pension, which was
the equivalent to a regular old age pension after
25 years of work. Cseres-Gergely (2007) estimates
that the financial incentive built into the pension sys-
tem had a significant impact on labour supply among
the older population. One of the driving forces behind
the rise in labour force participation after 1996,
depicted in Figure 5.3, was the gradual rise of the
retirement age.16
The transition to a market economy and privatisation
may explain the sharp drop in the participation rate in
the first half of the 1990s, while anomalies in the pen-
sion system may account for the lower participation
rate among 55 and 64 year olds. However, Figure 5.4
indicates that there must be other factors affecting
labour force participation in Hungary. The diagram
breaks down labour force participation into three age
groups: 15–24 years old, 25–54 years old and
55–64 years old. In addition, it shows the average
labour force participation in each group over

































































































































Labour force participation rates
average 2000-2010, in %
Source: OECD, last accessed on 19 October 2011.




15 Kézdi (2002) documents a sharp rise in skill premium during the
1990s. He also documents that there was an additional premium not
captured by measuring education levels for working at a foreign-
owned company.
16 Kátay and Nobilis (2009) provide a full decomposition of rising
labour force participation into different explanatory factors. They
found that, in addition to transfers, demographic factors and educa-
tion play an important role in explaining changes in labour partici-
pation in Hungary. Among transfers, old age pension is the most
important.EEAG Report 2012 121
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2000–2010 across EU countries.
The figure shows that, in terms of
labour force participation,
Hungary ranks lowest both in the
young and in the old age group,
and second to last in the prime
age, 25–54 years old group. The
variation within the prime age
group is significantly smaller
than in the others. The lowest
participation rate is 77 percent
and the highest is 89 percent. The
participation rate in Hungary
nevertheless remains 6 percent-
age points lower than the median
of the group. This difference is
11 percentage points in the young
and 15 percentage points in the
old age group.
A more disaggregated accounting for cross-country
differences in labour force participation reveals that
Hungary’s lower participation rate is mainly due to
three welfare dependent subgroups: the low skilled,
the working age population aged fifty or over and
women of child-bearing age.17
One of the key questions facing Hungarian policy mak-
ers is how to increase labour force participation. Higher
employment would increase income in Hungary relative
to the old EU member states for a given level of labour
productivity. It would also in  crease the tax base and
reduce government expenditure on benefits and pen-
sions. Here we discuss two policy instruments: taxes on
labour and the minimum wage. Let us begin by looking
at taxes on labour. The stylised facts on this topic are
summarised in Figure 5.5 which shows the average
labour tax wedges for 21 EU countries. The tax wedge
measure is defined as the difference between the total
labour cost to the firm and take-home pay, as a fraction
of the former. Hungary has the second highest average
tax wedge after Belgium. The other Visegrad countries
are behind Hungary by at least 12 percentage points in
terms of average tax. In 2011 the wedge declined due to
the introduction of a flat income tax at a 16 percent rate,
but it will rise again in 2012 due to the increase in labour
related taxes levied on firms.
The average tax wedge is a measure of the total tax
burden on labour. The greater that wedge is, the lower
the take-home pay for a given total labour cost. Lower
take-home wages reduce labour supply at the exten-
sive margin primarily for younger and older workers.
Benczúr et al. (2011) estimate a structural model of
labour supply on Hungarian household surveys to
provide more precise estimates of labour supply
responses at the extensive margin. They break down
the effect of net income changes into changes in take-
home wages, taxes and transfers. Firstly, they find
substantial heterogeneity in terms of labour supply
responsiveness across different subgroups. More
importantly, they find that labour supply responsive-
ness is high in all three subgroups, which account for
the most differences in labour force participation
between Hungary and other EU countries. Therefore
changing the benefit and transfer system or increasing
take-home wages are likely to have a significant posi-
tive effect on labour supply at the extensive margin,
and hence on participation. 
The effect of a minimum wage on the labour supply is
ambiguous. An increase in the minimum wage raises
the take-home wage, but lowers the probability of
finding work because firms are less likely to hire at the
higher minimum wage. The overall effect on expected
wage and hence on labour supply is ambiguous.
Minimum wage usually affects unemployment, but it
can also impact participation through the discour-
aged worker effect. However, the effect of minimum
wage on labour supply is non-standard in Hungary18












































Labour tax wedges in the European Union
average 2000-2008
Note: Tax wedge in each year refers to the average tax wedge for a single person at 100% of average earning 
without children.
Source: OECD, last accessed on 19 October 2011.
%
Figure 5.5
17 See National Bank of Hungary (2008). As far as the labour supply
of woman is concerned, it is important to note that the benefit per
child relative to GDP per capita in Hungary is the highest among
OECD countries. Hence, there is a strong incentive for women of
child-bearing age to drop out from the labour force. See Bálint and
Köllő (2008).
18 Hungary has a two-tier minimum wage system. Minimum wage
applies to unskilled workers, and the so called wage minima, which
is higher than the minimum wage, applies to skilled workers with a
well-defined educational degree.countries. The reason for this is that in these countries
the minimum wage interacts with tax evasion. Firms
and workers may decide to under-report worker’s
earnings to avoid taxes and social security contribu-
tions. In this case, workers receive cash-in-hand wages
in addition to their reported wages. Minimum wage
legislation affects the decision about how much of
workers’ earnings could be reported i.e., firms have to
report at least the minimum wage.19
Tonin (2011) provides a theory and evidence as to the
effect of such interaction on employment and take-
home wages. He constructs a model whereby mini-
mum wage and tax evasion interact. Firstly he shows
that wages are underreported resulting in a large frac-
tion of workers reporting the minimum wage.
Secondly, he also shows that an increase in the mini-
mum wage is equivalent to an increase in labour
income tax. This is because a rise in minimum wage
increases the fraction of workers’ earnings that has to
be reported, and hence increases the proportion of
these earnings subject to taxation and social security
contributions. To provide empirical evidence, he
analyses changes in the food consumption of house-
holds affected by the 2000–2001 minimum wage hike20
compared to those unaffected. He finds that food con-
sumption fell in the treatment group relative to the
control group. This fact is consistent with a decline in
take-home wages due to the minimum wage hike. This
has a negative effect on labour supply.
Direct evidence of the employment effect of the min-
imum wage in Hungary can be found in Kertesi and
Köllő (2002). They estimated a significant negative
effect of the minimum wage hike on employment at
small firms, but did not find a significant effect at
large firms. The reason for this difference is that
37.5 percent of employees at firms with 5–10 employ-
ees, 28.2 percent of employees at firms with
11–20 employees, and 17.2 percent of employees at
firms with 21–50 employees were paid the minimum
wage.21 Hence a minimum wage hike affects the take-
home wage of a much larger proportion of workers at
small firms than at their large counterparts. Thus, the
finding of Kertesi and Köllő (2002) is consistent with
the theory of Tonin (2011).
5.4 Fiscal policy
Hungary has been under the Excess Deficit Procedure
of the European Union ever since it joined the
EEAG Report 2012 122
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Box 5.1  
Hungarian experiment with the Fiscal Council 
 
The Hungarian Parliament passed a Fiscal Responsibility Act in 2008, which called for a Fiscal Council, an 
independent fiscal watchdog, to be established. The council had three members nominated by the President of the 
Republic, the Governor of the National Bank of Hungary, and the President of the State Audit Office and 
confirmed by the parliament for a non-renewable tenure of nine years. The council had its own analysts (Office of 
the Fiscal Council) and was required to evaluate the consequences of the budget bill, to prepare macroeconomic 
and fiscal forecasts and to scrutinise whether the budgetary practice of the government was consistent with the 
accounting principles described in the Fiscal Responsibility Act. The council was also required to assess 
quantitatively the effect of any legislative proposal with budgetary implications, including the effects of structural 
reforms. However, it did not have the legislative power to enforce its assessment. It relied on communication and 
the dissemination of information concerning the implications of the proposals as an enforcement instrument.  
 
After the 2010 elections, the new government, having won a two thirds majority in Parliament, abolished the 
Office of the Fiscal Council and narrowed the council’s remit to the requirement that the council state its broad 
opinion on the budget bill. The composition of the council also changed. The President of the Republic now 
appoints the Chair for a six year term on a part-time basis, and two other members are the Governor of the central 
bank and the President of the State Audit Office. The new constitution passed in 2010 limits the public debt to  
50 percent of GDP and the Fiscal Council also has to judge whether the budget bill satisfies constitutional 
requirements. 
 
19 Such under-reporting is relatively wide spread in Central and
Eastern Europe. According to a recent European Commission
Report (see European Commission 2007), 8 percent of Hungarian
workers reported receiving cash-in-hand wages in the previous twelve
month period. Other Central and Eastern European countries had
similar or higher figures. In contrast, only one percent of workers in
Germany, France or United Kingdom reported such incidents.
20 The 2000–2001 minimum wage hike was drastic. When the mini-
mum wage hike was announced in 2000, 32.7 percent of total private
sector employees earned less than the new minimum wage (see Elek
et al. 2011, p. 5). Over this two-year period the minimum wage dou-
bled in nominal terms, and increased by more than 50 percent in real
terms. The minimum wage had risen by 20 percent in nominal terms
by January 2012, which amounts to an increase of around 13–15 per-
cent in real terms.
21 The figures are from a wage survey in 2003. See Table 5 in Elek et
al. 2011, p. 30. Please also note that this fact means that there is a
spike in the wage distribution at the minimum wage as the theory of
Tonin (2011) predicts.EEAG Report 2012 123
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European Union in 2004. The left panel in Figure 5.6
shows the evolution of its deficit since 1990. As we
can see, there is a strong election cycle in fiscal policy:
the deficit increased significantly prior to every single
election since 1990. This very strong election cycle was
broken by the financial crisis in the run up to the 2010
election, when a politically weak government contin-
ued to implement the fiscal consolidation program
started in 2007. In addition, very little fiscal correc-
tion took place after the 2002 election, hence the gen-
eral government deficit exceeded 5 percent of GDP
until 2007 and was accompanied by a rapid accumu-
lation of public sector debt between 2001 and 2007.
Hungarian fiscal institutions are unable to credibly
commit politicians to a sustainable fiscal policy. This
fact is highlighted by the experiment with a Fiscal
Council in Hungary (see Box 5.1). As a result of the
deterioration in government finances in 2005 and
2006, fiscal adjustment was neces-
sary. As part of the adjustment
program, the Parliament passed the
Fiscal Responsibility Act in 2008,
establishing an independent Fiscal
Council. After winning a two thirds
majority in April 2010, the new
centre-right government abolished
the council in its existing form and
set up a new body. In particular, the
new Fiscal Council was stripped of
its staff and its remit was drastical-
ly narrowed. Without independent
forecasts and analyses, it is impossi-
ble for the new council to provide
the kind of fiscal transparency and
evaluation of sustainability that the original council
was able to. For example, the three members of the
Fiscal Council approved the budget proposal for 2012
with a two-to-one majority,22 while the European
Commission expressed strong reservations.23
In addition to creating a weak Fiscal Council, the
Hungarian parliament passed a new constitution,
which limits the debt-to-GDP ratio to 50 percent (see
Box 5.2).24 The problem is that the actual debt-to-
GDP ratio according to Figure 5.6 is over 80 percent.
The legislation stipulates that the Parliament pass
budget proposals aimed at reducing public debt levels.
In addition, it instructs the Fiscal Council to evaluate
whether or not the proposed budget fulfils this criteri-
on. However, the new Financial Stability Act passed
subsequently weakened the constitutional require-
ment by making the debt ceiling applicable from 2015
onwards, and stipulating that it does not apply when-
ever GDP declines. Enshrining fis-
cal rules in the constitution can
help to make fiscal policy sustain-
able and restore its credibility.
However, without independent
monitoring, evaluation and fore-
casting as conducted by the
 
Box 5.2 
Constitutional ceiling on general government debt in Hungary 
 
In spring 2011 a new constitution was passed which came into effect on 
1 January, 2012. It puts a ceiling on the general government debt at   
50 percent of GDP. In addition, it stipulates that if the debt-to-GDP ratio 
exceeds 50 percent, the parliament cannot pass a budget bill for the 
central government that would lead to an increase in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. The government can deviate from this rule if the economy is in a 
prolonged and deep recession. On December 23, 2011 the parliament 
passed a Financial Stability Act. It stipulates that if GDP declines in real 
terms, it should be understood that the economy is in a prolonged and 
deep recession. It also requires that, as long as the debt-to-GDP ratio 
exceeds 50 percent, the growth rate of nominal debt cannot exceed the 
difference between inflation and half of the growth rate of real GDP. 



















Note: Vertical lines indicate election years.
Sources: Barabás et al. (1998) for the period 1990-1994, Eurostat for the period 1995-2010,
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Figure 5.6
22 The two members of the council who
approved the proposal have recently been
appointed and have close ties to the gov-
ernment.
23 The European Commission’s Excessive
Debt Procedure report on Hungary pub-
lished on 11 January 2012 states that the
structural deficit in 2012 will exceed the 
3-percent-of-GDP Treaty threshold. In
addition, the assessment of the European
Commission is that “no effective action has
been taken to bring the deficit below 3 per-
cent of GDP in a sustainable manner”.
24 A debt limit in the constitution is not
particularly meaningful economically. It
specifically implies a strong pro-cyclical fis-
cal policy.Hungarian Fiscal Council in its original form, it is
hard to see how one can credibly verify whether the
government actually follows those rules.25
Despite the lack of a commitment device, significant
fiscal adjustment took place in 2007–2010 due pres-
sure from the markets and the European Commission.
The financial crisis made it impossible for Hungary to
continue its ill-disciplined fiscal policy, as borrowing
became more difficult and costly. However, putting
the deficit reduction on a solid footing turned out to
be a difficult task because of the size of the public sec-
tor in Hungary. There are few criteria to judge
whether the size of the public sector is small or large,
but one of empirical regularity is that its size tends to
increase with average income levels. Figure 5.7 plots
the government expenditure-to-GDP ratio against the
log of per capita GDP for countries in the European
Union. The size of the Hungarian public sector
appears to be larger than would be implied by its
income level.26 The graph also reveals that only five
countries in Europe had larger public sectors than
Hungary over the period between 2000 and 2008. In
addition, the public administration in Hungary is one
of the least efficient in the OECD countries.27 Hence
downsizing the government in Hungary can poten-
tially lead to efficiency gains. 
Despite fiscal consolidation efforts since 2007, gov-
ernment expenditure remained high. The implied high
overall tax burden and the inefficiency of government
spending may be one impediment to economic growth
in Hungary. In addition, the strong election cycle
increases volatility in aggregate demand. The higher
aggregate uncertainty in the economy generated by
fiscal uncertainty is another impediment to economic
growth.
5.5 Financial crisis and bail-out
The financial crisis of 2008 hit Hungary early on,
leading the country to request IMF assistance in late
October 2008. It is easy to see why Hungary felt under
pressure at that time. Figure 5.8 plots the net external
debt of a number of emerging countries (public and
private) against their public debt. At the end of 2007
most emerging economies either had high external
debt or high government debt. Hungary was the only
country with both high external and high government
debt. 
High external debt makes a country financially vul-
nerable, particularly if a substantial fraction of that
debt is denominated in foreign currency. It has been
argued, and also documented, that private sector
debt, particularly bank debt, is a contingent liability
of the government. In times of crisis, the government
is likely to bail-out the private sector.28 If the coun-
try’s external debt is high but government debt is low,
the government has the ability to bail-out the private
sector when an adverse external shock hits the private
sector’s balance sheet. However, if both external and
the public debt are high, then the government may be
unable to bail-out the private sector or if it does, it
may default soon afterwards unless there is external
assistance in place.29 The international financial crisis
found Hungary in such a financially vulnerable state
in October 2008.
We discussed above how Hungary
accumulated a relatively high level
of public debt prior to 2008. We
will now proceed to explain the
origin of this high external debt.
During the run up to accession to
the European Union, Central and
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Source: Eurostat, OECD, last accessed on 19 October 2011.
Figure 5.7
25 See Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) for
an overview of what fiscal councils do, and
why the change in Hungary is a poor exam-
ple of the development of fiscal councils.
26 Income level is not the only factor, which
may affect the size of the public sector. See
Rodrick (1998). 
27 OECD (2010).
28 This idea was originally emphasised by
Diaz-Alejandro (1985), and later formally
modelled by Velasco (1987). More recently,
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, 2011) present-
ed evidence, which is consistent with this
contingent liability hypothesis. 
29 Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) document
that high external debt is a good predictor
of sovereign default.EEAG Report 2012 125
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Eastern European countries liberalised capital move-
ments. Privatisation in the corporate and the banking
sector led to a large presence of multinationals in
Hungary. These multinationals had easy access to
international capital markets. In particular, banks
funded at low costs by their parent banks offered low-
cost mortgage loans to households denominated in
foreign currencies, primarily in Swiss francs. Un  -
derestimating exchange rate risk, firms and house-
holds, particularly liquidity-constrained households
to which the size of their monthly payment was
important, borrowed in foreign currency.30 As a
result, Hungarian households built up a large un  -
hedged foreign currency position. The difference
between this currency mismatch and that built up in
East Asia in the 1990s is that this
mismatch did not appear explicit-
ly on the banks’ balance sheets. 
Figure 5.9 gives an idea of the
problem in Hungary. The left
panel shows total foreign currency
loans relative to GDP, while the
right panel shows the foreign cur-
rency loans of households relative
to total household debt between
2002 and September 2008. Firstly,
we see that foreign currency loans
featured in all four Visegrad coun-
tries. However, in the Czech Re  -
public and Slovakia the dominant
foreign currency borrowers were
firms, and even that stock did not
exceed 10 percent of GDP. In con-
trast, the foreign currency debt-to-
GDP ratio in Hungary reached 30
percent, which means that about
half of the credit to the private sec-
tor was denominated in foreign
currency. In the case of house-
holds, foreign currency debt
amounted to almost 70 percent of
total household debt in Hungary
at the onset of the financial crisis
in Sep  tember 2008. Macro-pru-
dential regulation in Hungary
failed to address the problem of
systemic risk generated by foreign
currency loans, which made
Hungary vulnerable.31
The large stock of foreign currency loans created a
new channel for the exchange rate to have a signifi-
cant direct effect on the balance sheet of the private
sector. To see how hard the private sector in
Hungary was hit by the depreciation of its currency
after September 2008, we can consult Figure 5.10,
which displays the exchange rate of the forint, vis-
à-vis the euro and the Swiss franc. Between
September 2008 and March 2009, the forint depre-
ciated by 24 percent relative to the euro and 34 per-



























































Gross general government debt, % of GDP
Public debt and external debt in emerging markets in 2007
Note: Net external debt = gross external debt − international reserves excluding gold.
Source: Quarterly External Debt Data Base at the World Bank, last accessed on 19 October 2011,
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30 See Csajbók et al. (2010), Rosenberg and
Tirpák (2008), Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2010)
and Ranciere et al. (2010).
31 IMF (2011) provides a broad overview of the problem of foreign
currency loans during the current financial crisis.rate has not changed too much since; but the depre-
ciation of the forint vis-à-vis the Swiss franc
between September 2008 and November 2011
reached 66 percent. Ceteris paribus the foreign-cur-
rency-loans-to-GDP ratio would have risen from
the 30 percent of GDP in the third quarter of 2008
shown in Figure 5.9 to almost 50 percent of GDP.
Moreover, the depreciation also led to a significant
rise in monthly repayments over time and an
increase in loan delinquency. In addition, Hun  -
garian banks face a rollover risk. Banks primarily
lent in Swiss francs because the demand for Swiss
franc loans was higher than the demand for euro
loans due to the lower interest rate on Swiss franc
loans. The banks, however, were holding funds in
euros. They swapped their euro funds for Swiss
francs on the swap market. These swap contracts
needed to be rolled over periodically since their
maturities were shorter than the maturities of the
mortgage loans. As the international financial mar-
ket came under growing strain in autumn 2008,
however, the maturity of the swap contracts drasti-
cally shortened, requiring more frequent rollovers
and increasing the rollover risk. Finally, the Hun  -
garian sovereign did found it increasingly difficult
to issue bonds; thus increasing the rollover risk of
the sovereign. All in all, both the default risk of
households and the rollover risk of banks and the
sovereign made it potentially worthwhile to with-
draw Hun  garian assets. Such a run manifested itself
in a sharp depreciation of the currency in October
2008. Eventually Hungary turned to the IMF,
which together with the EU Commission provided
a 20 billion euro bail-out.
5.6 Recent policy measures and their probable 
long-term impact 
The centre-right government won a two thirds major-
ity in the 2010 election and embarked on a series of
unorthodox policy measures. These policies are
unorthodox in the sense that most of them are usual-
ly not implemented in developed countries, but they
are not unorthodox in the sense that they are new or
particularly innovative.
To keep the budget deficit on target in 2010, the new
government introduced exceptional taxes on the
financial, telecommunication and the retail indus-
tries, which are predominantly foreign-owned. Taxes
on the financial sector were based on past assets and
about an order of magnitude higher than taxes dis-
cussed in Europe. To boost economic growth, the
government cut the corporate tax rate for small and
medium size enterprises. More importantly, in 2011
it introduced a 16 percent flat tax rate on wage in  -
come. To support this drastic tax cut, private pen-
sions were nationalised at the beginning of 2011, and
the assets of the pension funds, among others, were
used to cover the revenue shortfall in 2011. The gov-
ernment also announced a plan to cut expenditure of
which relatively little had been implemented by the
end of 2011. Since economic growth did not increase
and tax revenues did not rise, the Hungarian govern-
ment announced an increase in the VAT rate from
25 percent to 27 percent, as well as increases in the
social security contributions paid by firms and sev-
eral other taxes in 2012. 
The government also aimed to
solve the problems of the foreign
exchange mortgage loans. Firstly,
it introduced a temporary mora-
torium on the repossession of
real-estate whose owners had fall-
en behind mortgage payments. It
also passed several pieces of leg-
islation in order to ease the prob-
lems of foreign currency debtors
(see Box 5.3). More specifically, a
legislation passed in September
2011 unilaterally changed the
terms of all foreign currency loan
contracts by allowing debtors to
make a one-off repayment of
their loan at a discounted ex  -
change rate. The costs of this
scheme are to be born entirely by
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the banks. In mid-December 2011 the government
and the banks agreed on additional arrangements to
ease the problems of foreign currency debtors. The
cost of these new arrangements was shared between
the government and the banks. None of these
arrangements has led to bank failures so far, but they
have certainly worsened the banks’ capital positions.
Banks can adjust to this by either raising capital or
reducing their balance sheet. They appear to be doing
both in Hungary. The reduction of balance sheets
implies slow or even negative credit growth in the near
future, which is likely to have a negative impact on
growth.
Introducing flat taxes has its merits. Several Central
and Eastern European countries followed this course
during the boom years. However, introducing flat
taxes during a recession is unwise because it may have
short-run recessionary effects. This is because moving
to a flat tax reduces the net income for low income,
high-propensity-to-consume households who faced a
lower tax rate before the reform, and increases the net
income for high income, low-propensity-to-consume
households. This effect was likely to be strong in
Hungary where the minimum wage was tax-free
before the reform. The beneficial effect of lower
labour taxes may materialise in the longer run once
labour supply has adjusted to the lower taxes, but this
is of little help in the short run. Taxing the financial
sector so heavily during such a deep recession and a
financial crisis also slows down economic growth –
one does not want to increase the cost of credit in a
situation where it is feared that there might be a cred-
it crunch. Such fiscal consolidation measures may
backfire as they ultimately make it more difficult to
meet the deficit target that investors view as sustain-
able. Doubts about the Hungarian government’s abil-
ity to bring deficits and public debt under control are
reflected in the gradual rise of Hungary’s CDS spread
since mid-2011 (see Figure 5.11). Reflecting the high-
er sovereign risk, the rating agency Moody’s down-
graded Hungarian government bonds below invest-
ment grade on 25 No  vember 2011, which was fol-
lowed by a downgrade by Standard & Poor’s on
22 De cember  2011.
The rapid deterioration in the outlook of the sustain-
ability of Hungarian government debt forced the gov-
ernment to call for IMF assistance once again. This
marks an important policy shift in Hungary because
 
Box 5.3 
Dealing with the problems of foreign currency loans 
 
During 2011, the Hungarian government introduced a series of measures to ease the problems faced by 
households with foreign currency loans. The three schemes below now run concurrently. 
 
1. The government and representatives of the financial sector agreed on an exchange rate protection scheme in 
which households could participate from mid-August 2011. Under this scheme the monthly repayments of 
foreign currency loans are calculated at a discounted fixed exchange rate (250 forints per euro, 180 forints per 
Swiss franc) until the end of 2014. The difference between the repayment at the market and the fixed exchange 
rate is accumulated as a local currency debt of the household on which it pays the interbank rate. Repayment of 
such loans does not start until 2015. 
 
2. In September 2011 the government, without consulting representatives of the financial sector, passed 
legislation enabling households which could afford to do so to make a one-off repayment of their foreign 
currency loans can do so at a discounted exchange rate of 250 forints per euro and 180 forints per Swiss franc 
between mid-September 2011 and the end of February 2012. The banks are to bear all of the losses resulting 
from these transactions. 
 
3. The government and representatives of the financial sector agreed in mid-December 2011 that: 
a) in cases where the foreign currency mortgage debtor with loans is delinquent for more than 90 days, its loan 
will be converted into local currency and 25 percent of the loan will be cancelled by 15 May 2012, provided that 
the value of the real-estate serving as collateral did not exceeded 20 million forint when the mortgage loan 
contract was concluded. Banks can deduct 30 percent of the losses due to this cancellation from the exceptional 
taxes they have to pay in 2012. 
b) Foreign currency mortgage debtors with loans delinquent for less than 90 days can apply to participate in the 
exchange rate protection scheme until the end of 2012. This scheme is like the exchange rate protection scheme 
discussed above with two important differences. Firstly, the household pays no interest on the local currency 
debt accumulated due to the difference between the market and the discounted fixed exchange rate. The loss due 
to the interest free nature of this debt is shared equally between the banks and the government. Secondly, the 
repayment of this loan will not start until 2016. 
 the government had refused to communicate with the
IMF after September 2010. However, events and the
consequences of its policies finally forced it to resume
talks. However, it is unclear at the time of writing
(15 January 2012) under what conditions the IMF
together with the European Commission is willing to
step in with a new loan. One of the reasons is that the
European Commission objects to several pieces of
recent government legislation including the Financial
Stability Act and the National Bank of Hungary Act.
The proposed changes in the latter are viewed as a
serious infringement of central bank independence.32
However, the Hungarian government has made it
clear that it has no intention of changing the pro-
posed legislation. Both pieces of legislation were
passed by the Hungarian parliament by the end of
December 2011.33
The Hungarian government’s policies do not seem
to address the main problems of the Hungarian
economy, and may actually make them worse.
Firstly, sector specific taxes will increase rather than
decrease distortions, which are a prime suspect for
low TFP growth in Hungary. Secondly, flat taxes
will not reduce the average labour tax wedge
because the reduction in revenues is compensated
for by higher social security contributions. This will
not help to increase labour force participation.
Thirdly, over-taxing the financial sector leads to
lower growth and makes the recovery from recession
even longer. Finally, and probably most important-
ly, nationalising private pensions, as well as the
invalidation of private contracts by governments (as
in the above mentioned forced conversion of foreign
currency contracts) increases expropriation risk and
undermines property rights. This may act as a deter-
rent to investment in the long run and hence reduce
growth. Moreover, the collective reputation of
Europe as a whole may suffer as a result of some
member countries not playing by the rules of the
Single Market. 
5.7 Conclusions
Hungary was initially the front-runner of market
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, but by the
end of the 2000s its economy showed serious struc-
tural problems, which manifest themselves in slow
growth, low investments and low labour force partic-
ipation. Moreover, its fiscal institutions do not
appear to be strong enough to eliminate the electoral
cycle in government spending. The financial crisis hit
its economy the hardest among the Visegrad coun-
tries. We can draw several lessons from the Hun  -
garian crisis. 
Firstly, a fiscal policy that varies strongly with the
election cycle may sufficiently increase uncertainty in
an economy to have a negative effect on investment,
which ultimately reduces total factor productivity
and economic growth. Hence the creation of a fiscal
framework that ensures prudent and sustainable fis-
cal policies is not only important to avoid financial
crises, but is also important to ensure sustained
growth. The Excess Deficit Procedure of the Euro  -
pean Union was unable to enforce fiscal discipline in
Hungary or in other EU member states. The Hun  -
garian crisis indicates that an
independent national fiscal
watchdog may be an important
component of an effective fiscal
framework. Such a watchdog
probably acted as an effective
constraint on fiscal policy in the
case of Hun  gary. If it had not,
the Hungarian government
would not have abolished it after
it criticised the government's
budget for over-optimistic as  -
sumptions and a lack of trans-
parency. 
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32 The European Central Bank also
expressed its strong reservation about the
proposed National Bank of Hungary Act.
33 On 17 January 2012 the European Com  -
mission started accelerated infringement
proceedings against Hungary over three
issues including the independence of its
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Secondly, the absence of labour market rigidities
does not necessarily ensure positive labour market
outcomes. Recurrent fiscal problems keep taxes on
labour high, which ultimately make take-home
wages low. This can have a negative effect on labour
supply, and eventually on labour force participation.
Minimum wage legislation interacting with tax eva-
sion can have similar effects. This, in turn, keeps gov-
ernment expenditure on transfers to those out of the
labour force high because it is difficult to change
politically. The equilibrium of high labour taxes, low
labour force participation and high transfers can be
difficult to change.
Thirdly, a financial crisis and a perilous fiscal posi-
tion often lead to government policies, which are not
conducive to long-term growth. For example, sover-
eign crises are often followed by financial repression
in developing countries during which the govern-
ment raises revenues from the financial sector. This
reduces credit growth, which has a negative effect on
growth.34 The Hungarian government introduced
exceptional taxes on the financial sector, which is
likely to have a negative effect on economic growth.
In addition, the Hungarian government also intro-
duced other measures, which undermined property
rights and private contracts. Strong economic insti-
tutions are crucial to prevent governments from
introducing such policies. These institutions were
not strong enough in Hungary. Hence its longer-
term growth is likely to suffer.
Finally, Hungary has implemented several policy
measures since mid-2010, which were greeted by
strongly-worded protests from the European
Commission and the European Central Bank. These
measures were nevertheless implemented. In particu-
lar, the Hun  garian government turned down a specif-
ic request from the European Commission in
December 2011 to put on hold two pieces of legisla-
tion until further consultation. This highlights that
the European Union lacks mechanisms to enforce
“good behaviour” on the part of its member states in
the short run. Hence actions undertaken by some
member states may have negative spill-over effects on
other members.35 Without enforcement mechanisms,
it is hard to see how the European Union can handle
a crisis more effectively the next time one occurs.
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